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FOREWORD: THE SUPREME COURT’S
SHADOW DOCKET
William Baude*
ABSTRACT
The 2013 Supreme Court Term provides an occasion to look beyond the Court’s merits cases to the Court’s shadow docket — a
range of orders and summary decisions that defy its normal procedural regularity.
I make two claims: First, many of the orders lack the transparency that we have come to appreciate in its merits cases. Some of
those orders merit more explanation, and should make us skeptical
of proposals to depersonalize the Court.
Second, I address summary reversal orders in particular. As a
general matter, the summary reversal has become a regular part of

* Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Thanks to Judith Miller for helpful conversations in the course of conceiving this
piece, and to Josh Chafetz, Nathan Chapman, Justin Driver, Roy Englert, Jeff Fisher,
Chad Flanders, Dina Mishra, Erin Murphy, Zach Price, Richard Re, and Mark
Shawhan for subsequent comments on it. Further thanks to Nickolas Card for excellent research assistance and the Alumni Faculty Fund and SNR Denton Fund for
research support. Finally, thanks as well to friends and readers at the Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com, where some of my thoughts on these topics first appeared.
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the Supreme Court’s practice. But the selection of cases for summary reversal remains a mystery. This mystery makes it difficult to
tell whether the Court’s selections are fair.
I catalogue the Roberts Court’s summary reversals and suggest
that they can be grouped into two main categories — a majority that
are designed to enforce the Court’s supremacy over recalcitrant
lower courts, and a minority that are more akin to ad hoc exercises
of prerogative, or “lightning bolts.” The majority, the supremacyenforcing ones, could be rendered fairer through identification of
areas where lower-court willfulness currently goes unaddressed.
We may simply be stuck with the lightning bolts.
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I. BEYOND THE MERITS CASES
We saw another side of the Supreme Court this year. As the
Court left town for the summer, observers noted that the term’s
cases were not as dramatic or far-reaching as in previous years.1
Indeed, the biggest term-ender, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, was not
even a constitutional case.2 The view that the Term’s merits cases
were a fizzle rather than a bang provides an occasion to examine
the rest of the Court’s work.3
Outside of the merits cases, the Court issued a number of noteworthy rulings which merit more scrutiny than they have gotten. In
important cases, it granted stays and injunctions that were both debatable and mysterious. The Court has not explained their legal basis and it is not even clear to what extent individual Justices agree
with those decisions.
It has also continued its long-debated practice of summary reversal of lower-court decisions. Those summary reversals have become more transparent and procedurally regular over time, but this
Term’s developments should prompt a more careful examination of
which cases are selected for summary reversal and why. Why, for

1 E.g., Adam Liptak, Compromise at the Supreme Court Veils Its Rifts, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2014) at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/us/supreme-court-termmarked-by-unanimous-decisions.html (“[t]he term lacked huge and profoundly
divisive cases like those that ended the last two terms.”). See also Laurence H. Tribe,
It Wasn’t a Pivotal Year, but the Wind Blows Conservative, SLATE (July 1, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2
014/ scotus_roundup/supreme_court_2014_a_year_of_uncertainty.html.
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). By my estimation,
the last term of which that was true was OT 2008’s culmination in Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
3 Like Fred Schauer did in his 2005 foreword, “I depart from the expectations of
the Foreword genre, one in which all Terms are more important than average.” Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda - and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 64
(2006).

4

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 9:1

example, do pro-government habeas cases so dominate the summary reversal docket? Are there not a similar number of civil rights
cases in need of correction in the opposite direction?
This Foreword examines both these aspects of the Court’s docket, and argues that they deserve attention and possibly reform. People criticize the Court’s merits cases for being political, unprincipled, or opaque. But those criticisms may be targeted at the wrong
part of the Court’s docket. It is the non-merits work that should
most raise questions of consistency and transparency.
That said, I should emphasize that my ultimate normative assessments are modest and tentative. I do not cast my lot with those
who think that the Court’s work is all politics rather than law, who
demand term limits for the Justices, or who think it important that
the Court televise its proceedings or publish more of its internal
work-product.
My point is just that the Court’s non-merits orders do not always live up to the high standards of procedural regularity set by
its merits cases, and that it may be possible for its performance to be
improved. Even if it cannot be, a better understanding of the orders
list should make us skeptical of some efforts to reform the Court’s
merits processes.
Only a few weeks into the 2014 Term, the orders list remains
front-and-center, with high-profile inactivity in the same-sex marriage cases,4 and divided decisions about stays in a range of cases.5

4 Robert Barnes, The Supreme Court’s Actions Are Monumental, But the Why of Its
Reasoning
Often
Missing,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
12,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-courts-actions-aremonumental-but-the-why-of-its-reasoning-often-missing/2014/10/12/ca1ccc9c4fca-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html; Adam Liptak, Justices Drawing Lines With
Terse
Orders
in
Big
Cases,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
27,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/us/supreme-court-with-terse-orders-hasjudges-and-lawyers-reading-tea-leaves.html?_r=0.
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As the orders list comes to new prominence, understanding the
Court requires us to understand its non-merits work — its shadow
docket.
A. THIS YEAR’S ORDERS
The orders list is not the hottest topic in Supreme Court scholarship. Every year, various journals publish symposia and special
issues devoted to the Supreme Court. The vast majority of the pieces published in those fora are about the opinions in the merits cases.6 The merits cases are at the center of the Court’s regular sessions,
which generally start at 10 a.m. and feature regular oral arguments
as well as the announcement of opinions in a public ceremony.
The orders list issues without ceremony, half an hour earlier. And until two years ago, the orders list was even more overshadowed by the merits activity, because it issued at the same time,
but again without ceremony.7 Now it at least gets a 30-minute head
start.
The most frequent orders are those granting or denying certiorari.8 But they are not the only ones, and the 2013 Term brought a

5 See, e.g., Order, Veasey v. Perry, No. 14A393 (Oct. 18, 2014); Order, Frank v.
Walker, No. 14A352 (Oct. 9, 2014); Order, North Carolina v. League of Women Voters, No. 14A358 (Oct. 8, 2014).
6 See, e.g., John Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 1284 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (2014); and each piece in this volume. I should note that the same could be
said about my prior work. See William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage After Windsor, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150 (2013); William Baude, Sharing the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 39 (2014) (responding to Manning,
supra this note).
7 Press Release, Supreme Court, Regularly Scheduled Order Lists (Sept. 24, 2012)
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_09-24-12. There
are also irregular orders that issue as needed.
8 The certiorari process has received some scholarly attention. See, e.g., Kathryn A.
Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2011); Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There A Place for Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310 (2010).
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surfeit of others. One of the Court’s last merits opinions was its
much-discussed Hobby Lobby decision, which concerned a claim for
religious exemption from a federal mandate to provide contraception. A few days later, the orders list contained a related dispute,
this time about the procedures required to take advantage of the
exemption. That second case, brought by Wheaton College, featured
a lengthy dissent by Justice Sotomayor (and joined by two other
Justices) which accused the Court of contradicting its own decision
in Hobby Lobby — “undermin[ing] confidence in this institution”—
and, more prosaically, of improperly using the All Writs Act.9
The immediate precedent for the ruling was also an orders list
episode. In Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, the Court had granted
a temporary injunction to another religious institution that had similar procedural objections.10 Justice Sotomayor herself granted Little
Sisters a temporary stay on New Year’s Eve,11 (just before she led
the countdown for the ball-drop in Times Square). A longer stay
was granted by the whole Court in late January. In her Wheaton College dissent, Justice Sotomayor objected that the “unusual order” in
Little Sisters was distinguishable, and also seemed skeptical about
its merits.12
The orders list also featured repeated litigation about whether
to temporarily pause lower-court decisions that authorized samesex marriage. In Herbert v. Kitchen, the Supreme Court stayed a fed-

Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2808 (2014).
134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014).
11 134 S. Ct. 893 (2013). Technically, “the disposition of applications to Justices in
chambers without opinion are not listed in the Supreme Court’s orders list,” Daniel
M. Gonen, Judging in Chambers: The Powers of A Single Justice of the Supreme Court, 76
U. CIN. L. REV. 1159, 1226 (2008), but they are part of the non-merits docket.
12 Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2815..
9
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eral ruling in Utah while it was on appeal.13 A stay was granted in
another Utah case in late June.14
Those orders were controversial but important. In an insightful
opinion in one case pending in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Andrew
Hurwitz wrote that while his own view of the procedural requirements would not have justified a stay, the Supreme Court’s order in
Kitchen “virtually instructed courts of appeals to grant stays in the
circumstances before us today.”15 He concluded:
Although the Supreme Court’s terse two-sentence order did
not offer a statement of reasons … and although the Supreme Court’s order in Herbert is not in the strictest sense
precedential, it provides a clear message — the Court
(without noted dissent) decided that district court injunctions against the application of laws forbidding same-sex
unions should be stayed at the request of state authorities
pending court of appeals review.16
But other courts refused to stay their orders until the Supreme
Court stepped in once again.17 None of the Court’s orders contained
any explanation.
The lack of explanation was compounded when the Court
then denied certiorari in all of these cases at the end of the summer.
The Court almost never provides explanation for the denial of certiorari, but one would have guessed that the stays were premised on

134 S. Ct. 893 (2014).
Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4715 (July 18, 2014).
15 Latta v. Otter, No, 14-35420, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16057, at *15 (9th Cir. May 20,
2014) (order granting stay and expediting briefing).
16 Id.
17 See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, No. 141167 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2014); McQuigg v. Bostic, 14A196, 2014 WL 4096232 (U.S.
Aug. 20, 2014) (motion to stay mandate denied).
13
14
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the probability that the Court would take up the issue. So something unusual was going on, but we don’t know what. In November, Justice Thomas expressed puzzlement about the issue too — or
feigned it? — noting dryly that the Court had declined to review the
marriage cases “for reasons that escape me.”18
On the more macabre side, the orders list also features the
Court’s routine encounters with the “machinery of death.”19 The
Court regularly receives last-minute filings debating whether a
pending execution should be stayed.20 This year, the results made
headlines after Joseph Wood spent nearly two hours seemingly
gasping for air before ultimately dying from lethal injection.21 The
execution happened because of a Supreme Court order, which vacated a stay that had been imposed by the Ninth Circuit over internal dissent.22
While it is unclear at the time of this writing what precisely
happened in the Wood execution, the Supreme Court’s order bestowed a gruesome prescience upon an opinion by Chief Judge
Kozinski dissenting in the proceedings below. Kozinski had argued
that lethal injections were a “misguided effort to mask the brutality

18 Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela, No. 14A493, 2014 WL 5878739, at *2
(Nov. 13, 2014) (Thomas, J, respecting the denial of a stay).
19 The phrase was made famous on the orders list — by Justice Blackmun’s dissent from denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (“From
this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.”). The phrase
also appears in Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919, 920 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
20 See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, KENNETH S. GELLER, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP, EDWARD A.
HARTNETT, & DAN HIMMELFARB, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 351 n.108 (10th ed. 2013)
(describing this process).
21 Fernando Sanchez & John Schwartz, A Prolonged Execution in Arizona Leads to a
Temporary Halt, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2014) at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/us/a-prolonged-execution-in-arizona-leadsto-a-temporary-halt.html?_r=0.
22 Ryan v. Wood, 189 L. Ed. 2d 873 (2014).
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of executions” and that firing squads(!) ought to be reinstituted instead: “Sure, firing squads can be messy, but if we are willing to
carry out executions, we should not shield ourselves from the reality that we are shedding human blood.”23
The list could go on. Just for instance: At the start of the term,
the Court ordered the parties to show up to argument prepared to
discuss a specific, named, amicus brief.24 During the summer the
Court also opened an inquiry into a capital defense lawyer accused
of filing a certiorari petition without the authorization of, or over
the objection of, his putative client.25 And just a week before the
official end of the 2013 term, the Court issued a divided 5-4 stay
authorizing the state of Ohio to reduce the days available for early
voting.26
B. PROCEDURAL REGULARITY
None of these orders is necessarily wrong, but they raise questions of procedural regularity—i.e., of the consistency and transparency of the Court’s processes.
The Court’s procedural regularity is at its high point when it
deals with the merits cases. Observers know in advance what cases
the Supreme Court will decide, and they know how and when the

23 Wood v. Ryan, 759 F. 3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting
from the denial of hearing en banc). Cf. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE
L. J. 1601, 1609 (1986) (“The judges deal pain and death”).
24 Atl. Marine v. U.S Dist. Ct., 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (“Motion of Professor Stephen
E. Sachs for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument denied. Parties, however, should be prepared to address at oral argument
the arguments raised in the brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as amicus curiae in
support of neither party.”).
25 Ballard v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 2842 (2014) (denying certiorari to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania); Ballard v. Pennsylvania, No. 13-9364, 2014 WL
3891551 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2014).
26 Husted v. Ohio NAACP, No. 14A336 2014 WL 4809069 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2014).
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parties and others can be heard. We know what the voting rule is;
we know that the results of the voting rule will be explained in a
reasoned written opinion; and we know that each Justice will either
agree with it or explain his or her disagreement.27
Indeed, procedural regularity begets substantive legitimacy.
The Court is subject to accusations that it is excessively political,28
but lawyers and the public nonetheless treat its decisions as uniquely conclusive.29 A sense that its processes are consistent and transparent makes it easier to accept the results of those processes, win
or lose.30
The Court’s procedural regularity may even facilitate its air of
mystery. While the Court follows regular processes to produce public and reasoned opinions, its internal deliberations are afforded far
more secrecy than the other two branches. It also resists televising
even its public proceedings, and individual nominees and Justices
regularly refuse to disclose their views on important issues. Perhaps
this mystery is tolerated in part because of the Court’s regularity;
we know that like clockwork the Court will eventually provide us
with a lineup and extensive reasoning for both sides of its disputed
cases. Indeed, perhaps the Court’s authority is enhanced by having
this mystery funneled through its regular processes.31

27 While there are occasional charges that the Court cuts corners in the end-ofterm rush, the opinions are still dozens of pages long and have been in progress for
months.
28 E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (2014); ERIC
SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS
JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012).
29 Cf. William Baude, Jurisdiction and Constitutional Crisis, 64 FLA. L. REV. F. 47
(2012).
30 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 106-109 (2d ed. 2006).
31 Thanks to Josh Chafetz for raising the points in this paragraph. For skepticism
about the legitimating value of Supreme Court opinions, see Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 1398 (2000).
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But the orders process, by contrast, is sometimes ad hoc or unexplained. For an instance of the ad hoc, consider the device of singling out an amicus brief for specific discussion at oral argument.
One can imagine sensible reasons for making this a regular practice.
The Court jealously guards oral argument time and rarely allows
non-governmental interlopers. 32 As amicus briefs proliferate, the
parties may not be ready for probing questions about all of them. So
such an order provides a device for the Court to make oral argument more productive without having to allow amicus argument.
Perhaps, then, it should be used more often, and perhaps not
just for amici. Surely there are a lot of cases where oral argument
would be more productive if the Court instructed the parties to
come prepared to discuss specific issues that weren’t adequately
briefed.33 And yet it is easy to see how this practice would create
complications of its own — how would the Justices decide what
issues to list? What would happen when they disagreed? And
would the listing practice encourage strategic behavior at the expense of the quasi-spontaneity that makes oral argument valuable?
The Court does not seem to have resolved these concerns in either
direction, so the one-off order seems ad hoc.
As for the inexplicable: The lack of explanation for the Wheaton
College injunction and the same-sex marriage stays was more consequential. On one hand, they seem to have been motivated by a
common-sense desire to preserve the status quo. But the Court has
rules for these things, and it is not easy to tell how they permitted
these orders. For instance, in her Wheaton College dissent, Justice
Sotomayor pointed out that members of the majority had previous-

32 See SUP. CT. R. 28.7 (“Such a motion will be granted only in the most extraordinary circumstances.”); SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 781-783.
33 See Daniel Bussell, Opinions First — Argument Afterwards, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1194,
1233 n.118 (2014) (discussing use of such instructions by some appellate courts).
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ly written that an injunction could issue only if the plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief was “indisputably clear.”34 The majority seemed to
reject this standard by protesting that its “order should not be construed as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits,”35 but
did not explain more. The Court issued a four-paragraph unsigned
opinion that left the legal standard and its legal basis a mystery.36
With respect to the same-sex marriage stays, I have briefly
touched on the mystery about granting the stays and then denying
certiorari. Even putting that aside, what was the irreparable harm
suffered by the state in the absence of a stay, if marriages were provisionally recognized over the summer? Was the theory that the
state might have been required to recognize the marriages permanently, even if it had prevailed? Or did the Court as a whole intend
to finally endorse the categorical claim that “any time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury”37? That

34 Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2810 n.3 (2014) (discussing Lux v.
Rodrigues, 561 U.S. 1306, 1307 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); & Ohio Citizens for
Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers)).
35 Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2807; Justice Scalia concurred only in the result and
hence the disclaimer cannot be attributed to him.
36 Richard Re raises the intriguing possibility that “the Court may have implicitly
narrowed the scope of the ‘indisputably clear’ standard, so that—going forward—it
will apply only to decisions issued by individual justices acting in chambers. Supporting this possibility, some of the in-chambers opinions emphasize the enormity of
allowing a single justice to issue an injunction, so perhaps the Court felt that it could
apply a lower standard once the application had been referred to the entire Court. If
this is right, then the ‘indisputably clear’ standard—whatever its prior force as precedent—is no longer the governing test.” What Standard of Review Did the Court Apply
in
Wheaton
College,
R E’ S
JUDICATA
(July
5,
2014)
at
http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/07/05/what-standard-of-reviewdid-the-court-apply-in-wheaton-college/ (also noting four other possibilities, and
observing that “all of this is speculation”).
37 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (quoting
New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977)
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quotation had appeared in two prior stays entered by single Justices, where it was not dispositive. Its one other appearance was in
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in a 5-4 dispute earlier in the
2013 term over the propriety of a stay arising out of a new Texas
abortion law; in that case it might have been conceded by the four
dissenters, but again it is hard to tell.38
The lower courts are apparently having a hard time telling too.
Consider the very recent litigation over Wisconsin’s voteridentification law in the Seventh Circuit: Two sets of opinions disputed whether the court should grant a stay. A panel of the court
specifically pointed to the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage stays
as evidence of “the public interest” supporting a stay.39 The panel
did not even mention irreparable injury. The citation of the samesex marriage stays seemed to operate as a substitute.
An opinion for five judges dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc pointed out that the panel had ignored irreparableinjury requirement, even though the Supreme Court had elsewhere
called it one of the two “most critical” stay factors.40 As for the
same-sex marriage stays, the dissent explained:

(Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). See Application to Stay Mandate Pending Appeal at 1718, McQuigg v. Bostic, 189 L. Ed. 2d 884 (2014) (No. 14A196).
38 Compare Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
134 S. Ct. 506 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The dissent does not quarrel with that
conclusion either.”); with id. at 507 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (not discussing that passage, but contrasting the “permanent” harms to the plaintiffs with the state’s).
39 Frank v. Walker, 769 F. 3d 494 (2014) (per curiam). The stay was subsequently
vacated by the Supreme Court “pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari,” over the dissent of three Justices and with no explanation. Frank v. Walker, 190 L. Ed. 2d (2014).
40 Id. (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc, Sept. 30, 2014) at 12 (citing Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435-436 (2009)).
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The uncertainty, confusion, and long-term harm that would
result from allowing thousands of marriages that are valid
for a time but might later be wiped away led to the stays in
those cases.41
But this passage did not cite an explanation by the Court — because there has not been any. Both sides of the en banc dispute were
treating Supreme Court orders as quasi-precedential. But it is difficult for lower courts to follow the Supreme Court’s lead without an
explanation of where they are being led.
Not only are we often ignorant of the Justices’ reasoning, we often do not even know the votes of the orders with any certainty.
While Justices do sometimes write or note dissents from various
orders, they do not always note a dissent from an order with which
they disagree. Justice Ginsburg recently told us, ‘‘when a stay is
denied, it doesn’t mean we are in fact unanimous.”42 And in a recent summary reversal decision, Justice Alito wrote: “The granting
of a petition for plenary review is not a decision from which Members of this Court have customarily registered dissents, and I do not
do so here.”43 This makes it hard for outside observers to conclude
that the failure to dissent necessarily signals agreement with the
majority course.

Id. at 13.
Mark Sherman, Justices’ silence after votes on executions underscores contrast,
ASSOCIATED Press (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news
/nation/2014/08/03/justices-silent-over-use-lethalinjection/bxqqmUd8npBt0RNPxIPAYO/story.html. Cf. Elena Kagan, Remarks Commemorating Celebration 55: The Women's Leadership Summit, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
233, 236 (2009) (discussing un-noted dissents from 1876 order denying Belva Lockwood admission to the Supreme Court bar).
43 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring); Ohio v. Price,
360 U.S. 246, 250 (1959) (various opinions). But see, e.g., Spears v. United States, 555
U.S. 261, 268 (2009) (noting that “Justice Kennedy would grant the petition for a writ
of certiorari and set the case for oral argument” and that “Justice Thomas dissents”).
41

42
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When combined with the minimal explanations for these rulings, the result is a Court in which we know very little about what
the individual Justices think about their own procedures. For instance, in the Wheaton College episode, the Court first issued a temporary injunction for several days to have the issue fully briefed44
before issuing the second injunction discussed above. Justice Sotomayor noted a dissent from both orders. Justice Breyer noted a
dissent from the first and not the second. Justices Kagan and Ginsburg noted a dissent from the second and not the first. None of
Breyer, Ginsburg, or Kagan wrote anything explaining why they
treated the orders differently, and given Justice Ginsburg’s recent
statement, we cannot even tell whether all of them did.
C. AN ASSESSMENT
The previous observations about the Court’s procedural irregularity are not meant as an indictment. Nor do I mean to suggest that
the Court’s orders should all attempt to duplicate the regular process of merits consideration and adjudication. When acting on the
orders docket the Court faces important constraints.
First, there is the time constraint. The merits cases proceed at
the Court’s chosen pace. The only two time pressures are the
Court’s self-imposed start-of-summer deadline for finishing the
Term’s work, and the general scarcity of the Court’s attention, famously charted by Henry Hart.45 The orders list, by contrast, often
faces stronger time pressure. In some cases the question is part of an
ongoing case whose schedule might be delayed. In other cases the
very question is whether the Court should pause proceedings in the
lower courts, so taking too long to decide is a de facto decision. And

134 S. Ct. 2898 (2014).
Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84
(1959).
44
45
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some cases involve external deadlines in the outside world — elections, executions, fire sales, etc. So it is not objectionable that the
Court sometimes trades procedural regularity for speed.46
Second, it may not be possible to have a fully prescribed set of
procedures for orders. The orders sometimes respond to unexpected or unusual developments in a given case, and the nature of
the unexpected is that it is hard to prepare for it in advance. For all
the reasons that standards are sometimes preferable to rules, some
of the orders ultimately come down to non-codified discretion.
The Court’s general taciturnity may reflect responsibility in
light of its awareness of these constraints. In the merits cases, the
Justices can make thoughtful, well-considered choices. When they
can’t do that on the orders list, perhaps they at least want to make
as few waves as possible, while minimizing the long-term systemic
consequences of thoughtlessness.47 Taciturnity helps draw our eyes
away from the orders and towards the long, reasoned merits opinions where the Court’s confidence may be higher.
All that said, some critical analysis is warranted. For instance,
even if there is no change to any of the orders procedures, a comparison might nonetheless make us more skeptical of certain proposals to reform the merits procedures.
Reformers sometimes argue that we should have a less egodriven court — one in which the Justices spend less time guarding
their own public image or worrying about personal consistency,

46 See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 421 (2009) (“‘No court can make time stand
still’ while it considers an appeal, and if a court takes the time it needs, the court's
decision may in some cases come too late for the party seeking review.”) (quoting
Scripps–Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9 (1942)).
47 Thanks to Richard Re for emphasizing this point. For a discussion of the Court’s
ability to avoid the merits, see Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). For a discussion of its ability to avoid making law even
when it reaches the merits, see Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 101 (1996).
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and more time as anonymous contributors to the institutional
Court.48 The current practice of the orders list provides a glimpse of
what such a reform would look like to the outside world.49
On the basis of that glimpse, I think there is much to be said in
favor of individual accountability. As a theoretical matter, it is not
necessarily possible for the Court to display perfect consistency
across cases, but it is possible to ask “each Justice to develop a principled jurisprudence and to adhere to it consistently.”50 And as a
practical matter, the orders list suggests that when individual personalities, and therefore individual reputations, are taken out of the
Court’s practice, the results might not always be as thoughtful.
Indeed, we have confirmation of this practical point from the
Justices themselves. When Justice Ginsburg was still Judge Ginsburg she wrote that “[d]isclosure of votes and opinion writers . . .
serves to hold the individual judge accountable” and “puts the
judge’s conscience and reputation on the line.”51 Similarly, Justice
Scalia has noted the effect of individual accountability on the Justices: “Even if they do not personally write the majority or the dissent,
their name will be subscribed to the one view or the other. They
cannot, without risk of public embarrassment, meander back and

48 Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court's Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1276-1283 (2010); James Markham, Against Individually Signed Judicial Opinions, 56 DUKE L.J. 923 (2006); for a contrary view, see Ira P.
Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1242 (2012).
49 Robert Post has also shown that there were stronger norms against publicizing
dissents during the Taft Court. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion As Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1267, 1309-1328 (2001) (discussing abandoned practice of “silent acquiescence”
in merits opinions).
50 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 832
(1982).
51 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 140
(1990).
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forth — today providing the fifth vote for a disposition that rests
upon one theory of law, and tomorrow providing the fifth vote for a
disposition that presumes the opposite.”52
And if the Justices are right about the effect of individual accountability in the merits cases, maybe there is something to be said
for a little more accountability in the orders too. Even if the orders
cannot and should not attempt to imitate full dress merits opinions,
maybe they shouldn’t always come out naked. For instance, the
Court could move toward a norm of more transparency about the
votes. It could also provide explanations for some of its more noteworthy actions. For instance, when the Court acts to reverse the decision of a court below, or acts over a Justice’s published dissent, it
could provide at least a brief explanation of the point of disagreement.53
The need for improvement is not urgent, but it is nagging.
It would be far too hasty to say that the orders decisions are
thoughtless or the result of unjustified inconsistency. But the Court
could do more to reassure us that they are not.
II. THE SUMMARY REVERSAL DOCKET
One of the more momentous occurrences on the Court’s orders list are its summary reversals. These are orders issued in re-

52 Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 SUP. CT. HIST. J. 33, 43 (1994). This is
not to say that judges should never change their minds over the course of their career. See Justin Driver, Judicial Inconsistency As Virtue: The Case of Justice Stevens, 99
GEO. L.J. 1263, 1270-1274 (2011); accord Scalia, supra this note, at 43-44. But they
shouldn’t “meander” from day to day, or at least ought to explain themselves if they
do. Id. at 43.
53 A dissent might also provide occasion for all of the Justices to disclose whether
they agree with the majority. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I., sec. 5, cl. 3, which allows a fifth of
a House to require the “yeas and nays . . . on any question” to “be entered on the
journal.” For more general discussion of such “submajority voting rules,” see ADRIAN
VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 85-113 (2007).
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sponse to petitions for certiorari: Rather than follow the typical
course of granting the petition and scheduling the case for briefing
and oral argument, the Court will simultaneously grant the petition
and decide the case on the merits, dispensing with further procedure. Unlike the merits opinions, they are not announced from the
bench by their author (and are generally per curiam).
These orders raise different questions of transparency and consistency. Summary reversals have become a regular part of the
Court’s practice, and the Court generally provides reasoned explanations for its decision to reverse. But the 2013 Term raises questions about why particular cases are selected for the Court’s attention in the first place.
A. REGULARIZING SUMMARY REVERSALS
The summary reversal has come a long way. Sixty years ago,
Professor Albert Sacks’s brief foreword for the Harvard Law Review expressed tentative misgivings about the Court’s summary
reversal practice and suggesting it deserved further study.54 A few
years later, Professor Ernest Brown’s own foreword was entirely
devoted to criticizing the enterprise of summary reversal on
grounds of procedural irregularity.55 Brown noted that the Court’s
then-current rules and practices “all militate to foreclose a comprehensive statement of the merits, even in compressed form.”56 Looking at the pattern of recent summary reversals from the Court he
also concluded that many of them were not obvious enough to justi-

54 Albert M. Sacks, Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 103 (1954). This was of course
the year of Brown v. Board of Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to which Sacks
devoted just over three of his seven pages. Some of the Court’s summary reversals
were desegregation cases, but by no means all.
55 Ernest J. Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1957).
56 Id. at 80.
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fy reversal, and criticized the Court’s failure to explain its rulings.57
He suggested that the Court reverse only after ordering supplemental merits briefing, and preferably after hearing oral argument.58
In his own Harvard Law Review foreword two years later,
Henry Hart called Brown’s piece “devastating.”59 The leading Supreme Court practice treatise picked up on the criticisms too and
repeatedly advocated that the Court curtail the procedure of summary reversal.60
Yet the summary reversal practice has not ceased, and wholesale criticism is fading. The current edition of Supreme Court Practice collects dissenting opinions that criticize summary reversal;
nearly all of them are by Justices who are no longer on the Court.61
Indeed, the current edition of the treatise now concedes that “there
appears to be agreement that summary disposition is appropriate to
correct clearly erroneous decisions of lower courts.”62
Instead, the Court has worked to regularize it, and the
modern practice is not subject to the same objections as the old one.
The summary reversal is no longer completely unexpected. The Su-

Id. at 82, 90. Many of the decisions were tax cases.
Id. at 94-95.
59 Hart, supra note 45, at 88.
60 See the succession of criticisms in Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 185-189 (2nd ed. 1962); Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 222-224 (4th ed. 1969); Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 363-367 (5th ed. 1978) and Robert L. Stern, Eugene
Gressman & Stephen M. Shapiro, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 280-287 (6th ed. 1986),
culminating eventually in SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 350-357.
61 Of the dozens of citations in SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 350357, the three dissenting opinions written by current Justices are Presley v. Georgia,
558 U.S. 209, 216 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261,
268 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Watts v. United States, 519 U.S. 148, 172 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). None of the three notes anything more than that the particular case at issue didn’t seem clear cut to that dissenter.
62 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 352.
57
58
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preme Court’s rules now explicitly discuss the possibility of “summary disposition on the merits.”63 The leading Supreme Court treatise warns advocates at length about the possibility that the Court
will summarily reverse based on the certiorari papers.64 The sheer
practice of summarily reversing a handful of cases every year creates a tradition that makes the practice not unexpected.
And the old practice had been of one-line opinions without reasoning—“of opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders
that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between the authorities
they cite and the results they decree.”65 Yet the Court now summarily reverses in written opinions that explain their reasoning.
These explanations guide the litigants and enable the Court’s reasoning to be judged.
This is not to say that the practice of summary reversal is
now free from controversy, or even that it should be. Even now, for
instance, there are procedural wrinkles: It remains quite obscure
how many votes are actually needed to summarily reverse.66 And

63 SUP. CT. R. 16.1 (“After considering the documents distributed under Rule 15,
the Court will enter an appropriate order. The order may be a summary disposition
on the merits.”). The rule was adopted in 1980. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note
20, at 343.
64 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 357 (“A respondent concerned over
the possibility of a summary disposition is well advised to concisely demonstrate
that the decision below is correctly decided, in addition to explaining why the case is
not ‘certworthy.’”).
65 Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957).
66 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE suggests that “[F]ive Justices” may “decid[e] a case
summarily over four dissents that certiorari be denied.” Supra note 20, at 343. But a
rule or convention “may prevent five Justices from deciding a case summarily if the
Court is unanimous that certiorari should be granted but four believe that the cause
should be fully briefed and argued.” Id. at 344.
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the Court sometimes summarily reverses without ever receiving the
record from the lower court.67
Scholars also continue to criticize individual summary reversals
or small classes of them as unjustified given the specifics of the
case.68 But even taking these criticisms at face value, the controversies have focused on a relatively small portion of the Court’s summary reversal docket.
The 2013 Term suggests that it may be time to look at the entirety of the cases selected for summary reversal.
B. SUMMARY REVERSALS IN THE 2013 TERM
In the 2013 Term there were five summary reversals. 69 The
number is fairly typical. I read through all of the summary reversals
in the nine full terms of the Roberts Court so far and tallied 56 — an
average of 6.2 per year.70 Compared to the thousands of petitions

67 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 350-351. For a recent example, see
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (Nov. 4, 2013), whose docket is available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-1217.htm.
68 Alex Hemmer, Courts As Managers: American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock and
Summary Disposition at the Roberts Court, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 209, 219-223 (2013);
Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (2012).
69 They are Williams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (July 1, 2014); Martinez v. Illinois,
134 S. Ct. 2070 (May 27, 2014), Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (May 5, 2014), Hinton
v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (Feb. 24, 2014), and Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (Nov. 4,
2013). I do not include in this total the more numerous “GVR” orders in which the
Court grants, vacates, and remands a petition for reconsideration in light of new
precedent, since those orders are a docket-management device, not an adjudication
on the merits. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court’s Second Thoughts:
Remands for Reconsideration and Denials of Review in Cases Held for Plenary Decisions, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5 (1983). But I do include summary-reversal-like decisions
which vacate rather than reverse after identifying an error in the decision below, e.g.,
Williams, supra, and Tolan, supra. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 510
(Dec. 2, 2013) (not listed) was an edge case that is closer to a GVR.
70 Appendix A.
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for certiorari presented each year, and even the seventy-some merits cases per year, these represent a very select group.
But how are they selected? Two different decisions cast new
light on a separate question. Even assuming that a particular decision meets the substantive criteria for error, when should the Court
summarily reverse it?
1.

Tolan v. Cotton

Consider Tolan v. Cotton, a civil rights lawsuit for the wrongful
use of deadly force. The Fifth Circuit had granted summary judgment to the defendant officers, and the Supreme Court summarily
ruled that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly applied the summary
judgment standard, remanding the case for reconsideration under
the proper standard.71 The decision was somewhat noteworthy on
its own because it marked the first time in ten years that the Court
had ruled against a police officer in a qualified immunity case,72
though the decision did not even conclusively deny qualified immunity, because the issue was left for remand.
What was more noteworthy was Justice Alito’s concurrence in
the judgment (joined by Justice Scalia):
The granting of a petition for plenary review is not a decision from which Members of this Court have customarily
registered dissents, and I do not do so here. I note, however, that the granting of review in this case sets a precedent
that, if followed in other cases, will very substantially alter

134 S. Ct. 1861 (May 5, 2014).
Ten years and a few months earlier, the Court had denied qualified immunity
in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), and two years before that it had denied qualified immunity in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). Before Hope, the most recent
one I have found is Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
71
72
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the Court's practice. See, e.g., this Court’s Rule 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law”); S. Shapiro,
K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice § 5.12(c)(3), p. 352 (10th ed. 2013)
(“[E]rror correction ... is outside the mainstream of the
Court's functions and ... not among the ‘compelling reasons’
... that govern the grant of certiorari”).

In my experience, a substantial percentage of the civil appeals heard each year by the courts of appeals present the
question whether the evidence in the summary judgment
record is just enough or not quite enough to support a grant
of summary judgment. The present case falls into that very
large category. There is no confusion in the courts of appeals about the standard to be applied in ruling on a summary judgment motion, and the Court of Appeals invoked
the correct standard here. See 713 F.3d 299, 304 (C.A.5
2013). Thus, the only issue is whether the relevant evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
is sufficient to support a judgment for that party. In the
courts of appeals, cases presenting this question are utterly
routine. There is no question that this case is important for
the parties, but the same is true for a great many other cases
that fall into the same category.

On the merits of the case, while I do not necessarily agree in
all respects with the Court's characterization of the evidence, I agree that there are genuine issues of material fact
and that this is a case in which summary judgment should
not have been granted.
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I therefore concur in the judgment.73
Justice Alito’s concurrence was thus a critique of the Court’s criteria for summary reversal. The fact that a decision is indeed wrong
is not an adequate reason for summary reversal without something
bigger at stake. And remember that the Court’s summary reversal
opinions usually explain only why a decision is wrong, not why the
case merited the Court’s attention.
Justice Alito’s opinion is more notable when contrasted with a
different opinion joined by the same two Justices and issued two
years earlier. In Cash v. Maxwell, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent from
the denial of certiorari that was joined by Justice Alito. Cash featured an alleged misapplication of the federal habeas standard, rather than of the summary judgment standard, but it was seemingly
subject to the same observation that it should not be plucked out of
the heap for summary reversal.
Not so, Justice Scalia explained:
It is a regrettable reality that some federal judges like to second-guess state courts. The only way this Court can ensure
observance of Congress’s abridgement of their habeas power is to perform the unaccustomed task of reviewing utterly
fact-bound decisions that present no disputed issues of law.
We have often not shrunk from that task, which we have
found particularly needful with regard to decisions of the
Ninth Circuit.74

73 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868-69 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
74 Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 616 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (citing eight prior reversals); see also Allen v. Lawhorn, 131 S. Ct. 562 (2010)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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Justice Scalia later made a similar observation of lower-court
disregard in a merits opinion for the Court,75 even if the Court did
not explicitly endorse Justice Scalia’s views about the selection of
cases for summary reversal.
Continuing the connection, shortly after Tolan, Justices Alito
and Scalia again noted a dissent from denial of certiorari in a habeas
case, citing the Tolan concurrence.76 The apparent implication was
that the Court was being inconsistent in its summary reversal criteria, engaging in “error correction” in Tolan, but then being unwilling to do the same thing in a habeas case.
This would not be the first time that Justice Alito played such a
game of tit-for-tat. In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court overruled
a prior criminal procedure precedent over Justice Alito’s strong dissent.77 Later that term, in Montejo v. Louisiana, Justice Alito joined an
opinion that overruled a different criminal procedure precedent.78
He wrote a concurrence criticizing as inconsistent those dissenters
who had joined Gant, suggesting that while he believed in precedent he did not believe in unilateral disarmament.79
In any event, taking all of their opinions together, Justices
Alito and Scalia appear to be gesturing toward an account of when

75 E.g.,

White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1701 (2014) (Scalia, J., for the Court)
(Court below “disregarded the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)—a provision of law
that some federal judges find too confining, but that all federal judges must obey.”).
For an earlier admonition, see Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 780 (2011) (Kennedy, J., for the Court). (“[C]onfidence in the writ [of habeas corpus] and the law it
vindicates undermined, if there is judicial disregard for the sound and established
principles that inform its proper issuance. That judicial disregard is inherent in the
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit here under review.”).
76 Beard v. Aguilar, 134 S. Ct. 1869 (2014).
77 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
78 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
79 Id. at 779-801. On the unilateral disarmament problem, see generally Joseph Isenbergh, Activists Vote Twice, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 159 (2003).
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the Court ought to summarily reverse erroneous yet “factbound”
cases. Their idea seems to be that summary reversals are warranted
in areas of law where there is an unusual epidemic of lower-court
judges willfully refusing to apply the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the law. And implicit in their votes is an assertion—true, or
not—that there is an epidemic of pro-habeas willfulness in habeas
cases, but not of pro-officer willfulness in civil rights suits.
2.

Williams v. Johnson

The Court’s final opinion of the term was another summary reversal that was pure ad hoc error correction. The case was Williams
v. Johnson, a habeas case that had been before the Court once before.80 In the previous round the Ninth Circuit had reversed a California state court conviction on habeas.81 While AEDPA normally
precludes de novo review of state convictions, the Ninth Circuit
had found that AEDPA’s standard did not apply, and that without
deference the conviction was unlawful. (The constitutional question
was whether the trial judge had improperly dismissed a juror because he seemed sympathetic to the defense.)
In that previous round of review, the Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit in a 16-page opinion for the Court, written by Justice Alito and joined by every Justice except Scalia, who concurred
in the judgment.82 The opinion held that the Ninth Circuit had been
wrong to review the conviction de novo, and that AEDPA applied.
It did not discuss the underlying merits of the case, which would
normally allow the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the case under the

80 134 S. Ct. 2659 (July 1, 2014). As with many of the other orders I mention here, I
previously wrote several blog posts about Williams as it was happening. One of
those posts was cited in the briefing. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1. Williams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014) (No. 13-9085).
81 Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2011).
82 Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013).
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proper standard — except for one sentence in the introduction of
the opinion, which summarized the holding thus:
Applying this rule in the present case, we hold that the federal claim at issue here (a Sixth Amendment jury trial claim)
must be presumed to have been adjudicated on the merits
by the California courts, that this presumption was not adequately rebutted, that the restrictive standard of review set
out in §2254(d)(2) consequently applies, and that under that
standard respondent is not entitled to habeas relief.83
The rest of the opinion went on to explain why the claim should
be presumed to be adjudicated on the merits, why the presumption
was not rebutted, and why the restrictive standard of review applied. It never again explained why, or even mentioned that, the
respondent should lose under that standard.
That produced a puzzle. Ms. Williams filed a rehearing petition
to clarify the issue, which was summarily denied as almost all rehearing petitions are.84 When the Ninth Circuit panel got the case
back it issued a per curiam opinion “taking note of the denial of a
petition for rehearing on April 15, 2013,” and affirming the district
court’s denial of the habeas petition.85 The two active judges on the
case, Judge Reinhardt and Chief Judge Kozinski, each wrote separate opinions explaining that they felt bound by the unexplained
clause of the Court’s opinion but hoped to be reversed by the
Court.86

Id. at 1092 (emphasis added).
133 S. Ct. 1858 (2013).
85 Williams v. Johnson, 720 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2013).
86 Id. at 1214 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“uncomfortable as I am with that result . .
.”); id. (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (“I hope I’m wrong . . . I take comfort in knowing
that, if we are wrong, we can be summarily reversed.”).
83
84
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Happily, the Court obliged. After considering Ms. Williams
cert. petition over the latter part of the Term, the Court started its
summer break with a one paragraph order implying that the clause
should not be followed:
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the
petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
vacated, and the case is remanded for consideration of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim under the standard set
forth in 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).87
While that decision can only be described as a very narrow
form of fact-bound error correction, no Justice publicized a dissent.
Of course, we do not know whether that means the decision was in
fact unanimous.88 But there are justifications for the summary reversal in Williams that even Justices Scalia and Alito might have
been able to agree with.
In Tolan, Justice Alito observed that a “very large category” of
petitions to the Courts alleged a similar kind of error. Thus, the
summary reversal in that case would “very substantially alter the
Court’s practice” if repeated.
By contrast, in Williams the claimed error was inherently a rare
one. It was a claim bound up with the fact that the case had been to
the Court once before. The claim, effectively, was that either (1) the
Court had made a mistake by including that language in its opinion, or (2) the court of appeals had made a mistake in thinking that
language was binding. (The third possibility, of course, was that the

87
88

Williams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014) (per curiam).
See supra nn.42-43 and accompanying text.

30

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 9:1

Court had meant to include the language and meant it to be binding; that possibility would have resulted in a denial of the claim.)
Asserted errors on remand from the Court’s own cases are a
much smaller category, by sheer force of the Court’s small docket.
And it makes sense for the Court to take a special interest in them.
Indeed, Justice Souter had written that “this Court has a special interest in ensuring that courts on remand follow the letter and spirit
of our mandates.”89 Moreover, since the Court’s opinion was what
introduced the confusion, the Court may have seen itself as responsible for correcting it.
C. ASSESSING THE SUMMARY REVERSAL DOCKET
The Court does not tell us why it picks cases for summary reversal. Some incomplete guidance is given by the Court’s rules.
Summary reversal is technically a form of certiorari and the Court’s
own Rule 10 lists three general criteria for certiorari. Several of the
criteria involve splits between federal and state courts and are not
generally applicable to the cases that come up for summary reversal. Two others may encapsulate many summary reversals — that a
lower court has decided a case in conflict with Supreme Court precedent, or that a federal court has done something so irregular as to
warrant the Court’s “supervisory power.” But even then, Rule 10
also notes that these criteria are “neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion.”90 And in any event, it is not pellucid
how those criteria shake out.
Supreme Court Practice just gives up, opining that “[i]t is difficult to perceive any trend in the behavior of the Roberts’ Court in

89 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1311 (1994) (Souter, J., in chambers) (citing In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255–256 (1895)).
90 SUP CT. R. 10.
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this realm.”91 In order to see whether this is so, I compiled a list of
all of the summary reversals issued in the first nine terms of the
Roberts Court, with the subject matter and identity of the prevailing
party.92 In fact, I think some patterns can be discerned, though I am
not sure that they can be completely explained or defended.
1.

Summary Reversal as a Tool of Hierarchy

First consider Rule 10’s criterion that “a state court or a United
States court of appeals . . . has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.”93
Many of the Court’s summary reversals appear to be designed to
ensure that lower courts follow Supreme Court precedents.
The implicit theory of Justices Alito and Scalia’s opinions in
Tolan and Cash is one example. Recall that their basic idea is that the
Court summarily reverses an unusual number of state-on-top habeas cases because the lower courts are engaged in a campaign to nullify the Court’s interpretation of AEDPA. Observers have also supplied the same interpretation of the Court’s practice.94
Other examples have been hinted at in recent scholarship.
For instance, in a recent article Professor Alison Siegler argues that
the “federal courts of appeals have rebelled against every Supreme
Court mandate that weakens the United States Sentencing Guidelines.”95 Siegler also notes several reversals and summary reversals
by the Court on sentencing issues that suggest that the Court is

SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 351 n.108.
See generally Appendix A.
93 SUP. CT. R. 10 (c).
94 Recent Case, 126 HARV. L. REV. 860, 866 (2013) (Court’s conduct “increasingly
resembles a concerted campaign against the circuit”); James J. Duane, Sherlock Holmes
and the Mystery of the Pointless Remand, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 169-70 (2013).
95 Alison Siegler, Rebellion: The Courts of Appeals’ Latest Anti-Booker Backlash, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), at 1, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484762.
91
92
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aware of and has stopped such rebellions in the past. Providing evidence of further intransigence in the lower courts, she urges the
Court to “step in . . . and stop this latest rebellion.”96
Similarly, Professor Christopher Drahozal notes a “relatively large number of summary reversals in arbitration cases” from the
Supreme Court that engage in fact-specific error correction.97 He
attributes this in part to “ongoing resistance to the Court’s arbitration decisions in the lower courts.”98
Looking at the entire body of Roberts Court’s summary reversals seems to confirm these examples. Of the 56 summary reversals, there were sixteen state-on-top summary reversals in AEDPA
cases — the highest number of cases in any specific category. And
there were several other categories that recurred at least three times
(i.e. at least 5% of the total). Two of these categories are the ones
named by Siegler and Drahozal: Booker sentencing cases, which featured three summary reversals in a single term, and arbitration cases, which featured three pro-arbitration summary reversals over the
Roberts Court’s tenure.
There are two other three-peating categories: progovernment summary reversals in Fourth Amendment cases
brought under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (of
which there are three), and state-on-top summary reversals in habeas cases that do not involve AEDPA (of which there are six). I am not
aware of similar allegations that the lower courts have been resistant to the Supreme Court’s mandates in these areas, but the
Court’s repeated interest in them might well suggest that it believes
there is such resistance.

Id. at 15.
Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the Supreme Court's Arbitration
Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2014).
98 Id.
96
97
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In addition to the areas where the Court returns to the same
issue repeatedly, there are several other summary reversals that
appear to be designed to enforce the Supreme Court’s supremacy in
a more case-specific sense. One such example was Williams v. Johnson, mentioned above. Two other summary reversals, like Williams,
had been to the Court at least once before.
In another decision, Eberhart v. United States, the lower court
was praised for having ruled the other way. It had followed outdated Supreme Court precedent because the Court instructs lower
courts that only the Court has the power to recognize when its prior
precedents have become outdated. And in Western Tradition Partnership v. Montana, the Court summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s attempt to distinguish the controversial and recent
decision in Citizens United v. FEC. Those cases are probably hierarchy-maintenance as well. Together, all of these cases add up to well
more than half (35/56) of the Roberts Court’s summary reversal
docket.
In the same spirit, it is also possible that judicial reputation affects the summary reversal docket. Consider Justice Scalia’s comment that the Court had to police the Ninth Circuit with special
care.99 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit is by far the most frequent entrant
on the summary reversal docket, appearing 18 times and making
up almost a third of the docket. The next most frequently target of
summary reversal is the Sixth, appearing six times. More than half
(10) of the Ninth Circuit cases were state-on-top petitions in habeas
cases. Every single one of the Sixth Circuit cases was as well.
There is some information at a more granular level too.100 The
Ninth Circuit has 29 full-time judges, but two judges appear on the

99 Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
100 See generally Appendix B.
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summary reversal docket over and over and over again. They are
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, appearing ten times, and Judge Kim
Wardlaw, appearing seven. No other judge joined a summarily reversed panel more than three times.101
Judge Reinhardt’s presence is probably no surprise to careful
court-watchers: Seventeen years ago, Judge Reinhardt was quoted
as saying of the Supreme Court that “they can’t catch em all,” and
as reporting that he believes that he is the subject of special scrutiny
from the Court—and understandably, given that quote.102 My table
suggests that neither Judge Reinhardt nor the Court have changed.
Judge Wardlaw’s relationship with the Court has not yet been the
subject of such extensive public commentary.
There are also three judges whose names appear repeatedly
in another column — the column of those who dissent from decisions that are then summarily reversed. They are Judge
O’Scannlain, whose dissents presaged three summary reversals in
the Ninth Circuit, and Judge Siler, who dissented in four of the six
summary reversals in the Sixth Circuit. No other dissenter appears
more than once.103
I do not mean to make too much of these particular names.
For instance, the fact that Judge Reinhardt’s name appears frequently does not mean he is a bad judge. Maybe other judges make the

101 The other judges appearing exactly three times are Judge Merritt from the Sixth
Circuit, Judges Pregerson and Schroeder from the Ninth Circuit, Judges Wilson and
Tjoflat from the Eleventh Circuit, and maybe Judges Bauer and Williams from the
Seventh Circuit, depending on whether one double-counts Corcoran, a single case
that was summarily reversed twice by the Court in two separate trips. Id.
102 Matt Rees, The Judge the Supreme Court Loves to Overturn, THE WEEKLY
STANDARD
(May
5,
1997),
http://www.theweeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/001/414ily
ss.asp. See also M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1029 n.15
(2010) (calculating Judge Reinhardt’s reversal rate).
103 See Appendix B. Out of economy, I did not include subsequent non-panel dissents, such as decisions respecting the denial of en banc review.
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same rulings as he does, but are given more of the benefit of the
doubt. Just as the Supreme Court has been said to be “infallible because it is final” and not the other way around,104 perhaps Judge
Reinhardt seems wayward because he is frequently reversed, rather
than being frequently reversed because he is wayward. And of
course that is putting aside the bigger question about whether lower court judges may or should defy the Supreme Court when they
disagree with it.
More generally, to put these names in context one would
also want to normalize by size and perhaps type of docket and
many other factors.105 But a focus on the orders list could still add
an important nuance to the study of which lower-court judges are
in repeated dialogue with the Court; even if other judges appear
before the Court with similar regularity,106 some judges may be
treated by the Court in unusually summary fashion. And for present purposes, this sheds at least some light on the patterns in the
Supreme Court’s summary reversal docket.
2.

Summary Reversal as Ad Hoc Prerogative

What about the other cases? I have listed the subject matter and
the victor in the appendix, but I find it hard to generalize them
apart from the category “other.” Many of them are one-off summary reversals vindicating a criminal defendant, in areas such as
double-jeopardy (Martinez v. Illinois), public-trial (Presley v. Georgia),
or Brady (Youngblood v. West Virginia). Interestingly, each of those
examples has been criticized by observers as not meeting the tradi-

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Judith Resnik, Reading Reinhardt: The Work of Constructing Legal Virtue (Exempla
Iustitiae), 120 YALE L.J. 539, 564-565 (2010).
106 Id. at 561-563 (noting that “Judge Reinhardt is one of is one of several judges
who are repeat players before the Supreme Court, and many have similarly high
numbers of cases reviewed during the brief period”).
104
105
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tional summary reversal criteria.107 Several of the remaining decisions also contain published dissents, and it is possible that such
dissents help ensure a case gets singled out for special attention.
Perhaps the Court is particularly likely to intervene when it thinks
the correct answer was staring the lower court in the face.108 But
many of the summary reversals do not contain dissents, and most
dissents do not become summary reversals.
Even once one crosses off the Ninth Circuit cases, the habeas cases and other categories mentioned above, and the cases with
dissents, there still remain more than a dozen summary reversals
that don’t fit into any obvious pattern.
So what more can one say about this residual category? One
might say that these reversals are in the spirit of Rule 10’s criterion
that a “United States court of appeals . . . has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
Court’s supervisory power.”109 They are not all in keeping with its
letter, since many of them feature state courts, not a “United States
court of appeals.” But the general idea may simply be that sometimes a court has done something wrong in an unusual way that
defies generalization.
These kinds of summary reversals might express the need
for a safety valve from general rules. Professor John Harrison has
noted that the executive’s pardon power is one example of this prerogative. “By and large,” he writes, “governments do good through

107 See Hemmer, supra note 68, at 217-218, 220-221 (criticizing Youngblood and Presley); Richard Re, Did the Martinez Sum Rev Apply or Change the Law?, RE’S JUDICATA
(June 6, 2014), at http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/did-themartinez-sum-rev-apply-or-change-the-law/ (criticizing Martinez).
108 Thanks to Justin Driver for this point.
109 SUP. CT. R. 10 (a).
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rules and not outside them.”110 And yet “no rule or set of rules captures practical wisdom.”111 Pardons attempt to supply occasional
wisdom or mercy while leaving the rest of the system intact:
They should be like lightning bolts, relatively rare and in
principle hard to predict because their incidence, although
chosen on a reasoned basis, cannot be accounted for in advance by the imperfect approximations of reality on which
legal rules are based.112
The function of the prerogative need not be limited to the executive branch. The same function has been attributed to equity,
though by the sixteenth century equity was no longer a series of
lightning bolts,113 and scholars who advocate equity as a safety
valve do not necessarily intend for it to be rare.114
Perhaps this portion of the Court’s summary reversal docket operates like Harrison’s prerogative. A pardon, of course, is a
decision to depart from the law, while a summary reversal is a decision to enforce it. But the decision to pick a case for summary reversal is a discretionary certiorari decision. Those decisions are rare
and hard to predict, but we hope they are made on a reasoned basis
nonetheless.

John Harrison, Pardon as Prerogative, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 147 (2001).
Id.
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 125-126 (2008).
114 Kenneth Ayotte, Ezra Friedman, and Henry E. Smith, A Safety Valve Model of
Equity as Anti-Opportunism, (unpublished draft Mar. 30, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245098. Thanks to Sam Bray
for these points.
110
111
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Questions of Agenda Selection

Both of these visions, and especially their combination, raise
questions of procedural regularity, but they are not the questions
usually raised by summary reversal critics. The point is not that the
parties lack adequate notice of the Court’s practices. Nor is the
point that the individual summary reversals are unjustified or insufficiently clear. Rather, the point is that agenda selection is important, but the Court’s criteria here are not explained and may not
be fully thought through.
Think of the other miscellaneous orders discussed in Part I,
where we do not know why the Court is doing what it’s doing, and
do not even know whether the Court agrees on a single view or rationale. Summary reversals are more transparent in an important
sense: they tell us why the lower court was wrong. But nonetheless,
they do not tell us why this lower-court error was singled out for
judicial attention.
The Court does not reverse every error, or even every clear error, that comes through the door. Maybe it could: At oral argument
last month, Justice Scalia jokingly suggested that “I guess it’s an
abuse of discretion whenever we fail to correct a clear error of law
on a petition for certiorari. Right?”115 But Justice Scalia was offering
the suggestion sarcastically — it was supposed to be the absurdum
in a reductio ad absurdum.116
If the Court does not reverse every error, then we return to
the question of which classes of error are selected for judicial attention. If I am right that a majority of the summary reversal decisions
are designed to enforce the Court’s supremacy, then this opens up
new grounds for investigation and debate.

115
116

ia, J.).

Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Dart Cherokee v Owens, 134 S. Ct. 1788.,
Id. (“I thought we just had the power to say we don’t feel like taking it.”) (Scal-
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It has been observed that “the current Court’s disdain for
error correction is selective” and seems to work largely to the detriment of “criminal defendants and habeas petitioners.”117 The current selection of cases gives rise to at least two possible interpretations. One is that the Court spends its resources on “error correction” when it perceives a rebellion in the lower courts, and it is unaware of any comparable rebellions in the other “direction.”118 The
more cynical interpretation is that the Court ignores classes of error
that it doesn’t mind or doesn’t care about.
Further research and identification of these cases — both by
scholars and by lower court judges — could either change this practice or illuminate the Court’s true criteria. For instance, are Justices
Alito and Scalia correct in their implicit suggestion that lower
courts willfully resist the Court’s AEDPA precedents but not its civil rights precedents? And in what other areas might lower court
willfulness currently be going undetected or unaddressed? If one
could systematically identify classes of cases where the lower courts
are repeatedly defying the Supreme Court’s views of the law, then
the Court may either pick up the mantle or reveal that its cases are
selected for some other reason.119
That leaves the “lightning bolts.” Here, I am less optimistic that
reform is possible, and less pessimistic that it is necessary. If every
individual summary reversal is in fact an example of clear error it is
hard to criticize them individually. In the moment, it is hard to
stand on a general and abstract principle of regularity when there is

117 Robert M. Yablon, Justice Sotomayor and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Process,
123 YALE L.J. FORUM 551, 562 (2014).
118 Id. at 563 (suggesting that lower courts be reminded that that “errors in criminal cases can run in both directions”).
119 For an example of scholarship attempting this, see Shon Hopwood, The Not So
Speedy Trial Act, 89 WASH. L. REV. 709, 744-45 (2014) (advocating summary reversal
on certain speedy trial act issues).
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a real manifest error to be corrected. And systematically, they may
be the best that we can do.
The ideal Supreme Court would bear little resemblance to Zeus.
But a narrow outlet for judicial prerogative — limited to reversing
real and clear errors by the lower courts — may simply be the best
practical accommodation of rules and discretion. Our best hope is
that the Court exercises that prerogative thoughtfully and wisely.
CONCLUSION
There is a frequent mixed review of the Supreme Court that
goes something like this: Most of the time, in its low-profile cases,
the Court behaves in a professional, organized, and lawyerly manner. It is just in the hot-button, high-stakes, sharply divided cases
that law runs out and politics and personal preferences take over.
The Court is at its most orderly and lawyerly when it is less divided
and out of the media spotlight.120
I’m not sure I agree with that assessment of the hot-button
cases, but let us put that aside for another day. The orders list suggests that if there is a problem at the Supreme Court, it may be the
opposite of the usual narrative. It is on technical procedural and
administrative questions when the spotlight is off that the Court’s
decisions seem to deviate from its otherwise high standards of
transparency and legal craft.

120 For versions of this account (each with their own nuances, of course) see, e.g.,
Geoffrey Stone, The Behavior of Supreme Court Justices When Their Behavior Counts The
Most, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY (2013),
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Stone_-_Behavior_of_Justices.pdf. Senator Barack Obama, Remarks on the Confirmation of Judge John Roberts,
http://obamaspeeches.com/031-Confirmation-of-Judge-John-Roberts-ObamaSpeech.htm.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY REVERSALS IN THE ROBERTS
COURT

Name

Date

Subject

Successful
Petitioner

Williams v.
Johnson*

July 1,
2014

Habeas

Prisoner

Martinez v.
Illinois

May
27,
2014

Double
Defendant
Jeopardy

Ill. Sup.
Ct.

Tolan v.
Cotton

May 5,
2014

S. 1983
(4th
Plaintiff
Am./QI)

5th Cir.

Hinton v.
Alabama

Feb. 24, Strick2014
land

Prisoner

Nevada v.
Jackson

S. 1983
Nov. 4,
(4th
Officer
2013
Am./QI)
June
Habeas
24,
(ProceState
2013
dure)
June 3, Habeas
State
2013
(AEDPA)

Marshall v.
Rodgers

April 1, Habeas
State
2013
(AEDPA)

Nitro-lift
Tech. v.
Howard

Nov.
26,
2012

Stanton v.
Sims
Ryan v.
Schad

Arbitration

Employer

Lower
Court

9th Cir.

Ala. Ct.
Crim.
App.
9th Cir.

9th Cir.

Lower Court
Majority
(author is
bold)
Kozinski,
Reinhardt,
Whyte
Freeman,
Kilbride,
Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Theis
Barksdale,
Jones, Southwick
Kellum, Windom, Welch,
Burke, Joiner
Reinhardt,
Silverman,
Wardlaw
Reinhardt,
Schroeder,

Dissent

Burke

Graber

Reinhardt,
Goodwin
Murguia
Zouhary, W.
9th Cir. Fletcher, Reinhardt
Watt, Colbert,
Reif, Kauger,
Okla.
Winchester,
Sup. Ct. Edmondson,
Taylor, Combs,
Gurich
9th Cir.
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Lefemine v.
Wideman

Att’y
Nov. 5, Fees/
2012
Civil
Rights

Plaintiff

4th Cir.

American
Tradition
Partnership
v. Bullock

June
25,
2012

Speaker

McGrath,
Mont.
Morris, Cotter, Baker,
Sup. Ct. Wheat, and
Nelson
Rice

Parker v.
Matthews
Coleman v.
Johnson

June
11,
2012
May
29,
2012

Campaign
Finance

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

6th Cir.

Clay, Moore

Siler

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

3rd Cir.

Nygaard,
McKee

Chagares

Marmet
Health Care Feb. 21, ArbitraCenter v.
2012
tion
Brown
Wetzel v.
Lambert
Ryburn v.
Huff
Hardy v.
Cross
Bobby v.
Dixon
KPMG v.
Cocchi

Wynn, Duncan, Diaz

Employer

Feb. 21, Habeas
State
2012
(AEDPA)
S.1983
Jan. 23,
(4th
Officer
2012
Am./QI)
Dec.
Habeas
12,
State
(AEDPA)
2011
Nov. 7, Habeas
State
2011
(AEDPA)
Auditor
Nov. 7, Arbitra(pro2011
tion
arbitration)

Ketchum,
W.Va.
Workman,
Sup. Ct. McHugh,
Gaujot
Barry, Har3rd Cir. diman, Stapleton
9th Cir.

Marbley,
Kozinski

7th Cir.

Williams,
Kanne, Rovner

6th Cir.

Merritt, Cole

Fla. 4th
DCA

Warner, Polen,
Farmer

Cavazos v.
Smith

Oct. 31, Habeas
State
2011
(AEDPA)

9th Cir.

Pregerson,
Canby, Reed

United
States v.
Juvenile
Male**

June
27,
United
2011 & Mootness
States
June 7,
2010

9th Cir.

Reinhardt,
Tashima,
McKeown

Rawlinso
n

Siler

2015]

Bobby v.
Mitts
Felkner v.
Jackson
Swarthout
v. Cooke***
(Cooke v.
Solis)
Swarthout
v. Cooke***
(Clay v.
Kane)
Wilson v.
Corcoran*

May 2,
2011
March
21,
2011

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

6th Cir.

Merritt, Martin Siler

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

9th Cir.

Schroeder,
Rawlinson,
Collins

Habeas
Jan. 24,
(Due
2011
Process)

State

9th Cir.

Reinhardt,
Wardlaw, M.
Smith

Habeas
Jan. 24,
(Due
2011
Process)

State

9th Cir.

Pregerson,
Wardlaw,
Leighton

Habeas
(Misc.)

State

7th Cir.

Bauer, Williams, Sykes

Strickland

Prisoner

11th Cir. Marcus, Tjoflat Carnes

Thaler v.
Haynes

Nov. 8,
2010
May
24,
2010
Feb. 22,
2010

Wilkins v.
Gaddy

Jefferson v.
Upton
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Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

5th Cir.

Dennis, Jolly,
Clement

Feb. 22, S.1983
Plaintiff
2010
(8th Am.)

4th Cir.

Motz, Shedd,
Hamilton

Wellons v.
Hall

Habeas
Jan. 19,
(Due
2010
Process)

Prisoner

11th Cir.

Wilson,
Tjoflat, Black

Presley v.
Georgia

Jan. 19, Public
2010
Trial

Prisoner/
Defendant

McDaniel v. Jan. 11, Habeas
State
Brown
2010
(AEDPA)
Michigan v. Dec. 7,
Fisher
2009
Porter v.
McCollum
Wong v.
Belmontes*

Nov.
30,
2009
Nov.
16,

4th Am.
Habeas
(Strickland)
Habeas
(Strick-

State

Hines, Carley,
Ga. Sup. Thompson,
Ct.
Benham, Melton
Wardlaw,
9th Cir.
Hawkins
Talbot,
Mich.
Cavanagh,
Ct. App.
Zahra

Prisoner/
Defendant

11th Cir.

Carnes, Wilson, Pryor

State

9th Cir.

Reinhardt,
Paez

Sears,
Hunstein
O'Scannla
in

O'Scannla
in
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2009

land)

Habeas
Nov. 9,
(Strick2009
land)
Habeas
Corcoran v. Oct. 20,
(ProceLevenhagen 2009
dure)
June
Habeas
Sears v.
29,
(StrickUpton
2010
land)
Bobby v.
Van Hook

State

6th Cir.

Merritt, Martin, Moore

Prisoner

7th Cir.

Bauer, Sykes

Prisoner

Ga. Trial
Girardeau
Ct.

Railroad

Ct. App.
Susano, Lee,
Tenn
Ogle
(ED)

CSX Transportation v.
Hensley

June 1,
2009

Nelson v.
United
States

Jan. 26,
Booker
2009

Prisoner

4th Cir.

Spears v.
United
States

Jan. 21,
Booker
2009

Prisoner

8th Cir.

Oct. 14,
Booker
2008

Prisoner

8th Cir.

Moore v.
United
States
Wright v.
Van Patten
Allen v.
Siebert
Erickson v.
Pardus

FELA

Jan. 7,
2008
Nov. 5,
2007

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)
Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

June 4,
2007

S.1983
Plaintiff/
(8th Am.) Prisoner

May
Los Angeles
21,
v. Rettele
2007

S. 1983
State
(4th Am.)

Williams

Niemeyer,
Duncan, Hamilton
Riley, Loken,
Wollman,
Murphy,
Melloy, Smith,
Bye, Lay
Colloton,
Gruender,
Benton, Shepherd
Loken, Smith,
Gruender

Evans, WilCoffey
liams
Barkett,
11th Cir.
Tjoflat, Wilson
Anderson,
10th Cir. O’Brien,
Porfilio
7th Cir.

9th Cir.

Pregerson,
Thomas

Cowen
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Youngblood June
v. West
19,
Virginia
2006

Brady

Whitman v. June 5,
DOT
2006

JurisdicPlaintiff/
tion/Prec
Employee
lusion

9th Cir.

Wardlaw,
Kleinfeld, Hall

Salinas v.
United
States

April
24,
2006

Sentencing

5th Cir.

Davis, Jones,
Garza

Gonzales v.
Thomas

April
17,
2006

ImmigraUnited
tion ProStates
cedure

Ash v.
Tyson

Feb. 21, EmPlaintiff/
2006
ployment Employee

Foreign
Feb. 21,
Immuni2006
ty
Nov.
Bradshaw v.
Habeas
28,
Richey
(AEDPA)
2005
Eberhart v.
Oct. 31, JurisdicUnited
2005
tion
States****
Kane v.
Oct. 31, Habeas
Espitia
2005
(AEDPA)
Iran v. Elahi

Prisoner

Prisoner

Benjamin,
W.Va.
Albright,
Sup. Ct.
Maynard

Iran/
United
States

Wardlaw,
Schroeder,
Reinhardt,
9th Cir.
Hawkins, Silverman, Graber, Paez
Dubina,
11th Cir. Carnes, Marcus
B. Fletcher,
9th Cir. Wardlaw,
Fisher

State

6th Cir.

Cole,
Daughtrey

Prisoner

7th Cir.

Flaum, Bauer,
Posner

State

9th Cir.

Schriro v.
Smith

Oct. 17, Habeas
2005
(Misc.)

State

9th Cir.

Dye v.
Hofbauer

Oct. 11, Habeas
2005
(Misc.)

Prisoner

6th Cir.

Davis,
Starcher

Rymer,
O'Scannlai
n, Kleinfeld, Bea

Siler

Canby, Hansen, Rawlinson
Reinhardt,
Thompson,
Ferguson
Daughtrey,
Boggs,
Economus

*Case had previously been decided by Court.
**Case was certified to a state court and Court issued two
opinions.
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***Two lower court opinions reversed in a single case.
****Lower court was praised for ruling correctly.
In general, I compiled this list by looking at every opinion on
the Supreme Court’s opinions list for the relevant terms labeled
“per curiam” and then reading it to see whether it was a summary
reversal and if so what the issues were and who won. Per curiam
decisions that were not before the Court on certiorari—for instance
mandatory appeals, and applications for a stay—were omitted from
the list.
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APPENDIX B: LOWER COURT JUDGES AND THE SUMMARY
REVERSAL DOCKET
Judge
Stephen Reinhardt
Kim Wardlaw
Gilbert Merritt
William Bauer
Ann Williams
Harry Pregerson
Mary Schroeder
Gerald Tjoflat
Charles Wilson
Eugene Siler
Diarmud O’Scannlain

Circuit
9th Cir.
9th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
7th Cir.
9th Cir.
9th Cir.
11th Cir.
11th Cir.
6th Cir.
9th Cir.

Reviewed Opinions
10
7
3
3*
3* (and a dissent)
3
3
3
3
4 (dissents)
3 (dissents)

*Assuming one counts Wilson v. Corcoran and Corcoran v. Levenhagen
as two separate summary reversals.

